This paper provides new measures of government enforcement of labor regulations in Latin America and explores how it is affected by external and domestic factors. Using a panel of presidential terms in 18 Latin American countries between 1985 and 2009, I find that trade openness has a negative effect on inspection resources and activities, and that parties on the left of the political spectrum increase enforcement when they are in power.
I also find that FDI penetration has a positive effect on inspection activities, but the relation is more imprecise.
Introduction
Most developing countries have extensive labor regulations, but there is widespread concern that these regulations are not fully enforced. How many resources and effort do developing countries devote to enforce their labor laws? Do we observe changes over time? Which factors explain enforcement? Does economic globalization produce a race to bottom, wherein governments reduce enforcement in order to compete and attract foreign capital? Does enforcement respond to the demands of local interest groups and their elected representatives? Despite the importance of these questions little empirical research is available.
This paper presents new measures of government enforcement of labor regulations for 18
Latin American countries from 1985 to 2009, and empirically explores how international and domestic factors shape enforcement in the region. Enforcement plays an important role according to several literatures as described below, but lack of data has so far prevented testing these theories. This paper attempts to contribute towards filling this gap.
There is debate whether economic globalization improves labor standards in developing countries. Neumayer and Soysa (2006) find that countries that are more open to trade have fewer collective labor rights violations, while Mosley and Uno (2007) find the contrary effect, although they also find that foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows are negatively associated with violations. The "racing to the bottom" or "climbing to the top" debate is in part about how governments in developing countries react to the competitive pressure and the dislocation effects of globalization. Do they turn a blind eye to labor regulations in order to reduce labor costs, and hence remain competitive and retain or attract FDI? Or do they increase enforcement in order to expand the coverage of the employment protection system, and hence compensate workers for the uncertainties and dislocations produced by globalization? Do multinational corporations induce governments to improve the rule of law? While it seems apparent that globalization has altered the margins of choice available to governments, we still know little about how it has affected a key policy instrument: labor inspections. I find that trade openness has a negative effect on government enforcement resources and activities and FDI has a positive impact on inspections, although the latter result is more imprecise. These results suggest that government enforcement is an important factor mediating the relationship between economic globalization and working conditions. Enforcement is likely to be affected not only by external, but also internal factors.
Furthermore, recent studies of labor regulation in developing countries stress the importance of domestic variables. Political scientists show that political legacies, local interest group and their elected representatives played a key role in shaping labor codes in the region (Botero et al. 2004; Cook 2007; Murillo 2005; Murillo and Schrank 2005) . A principal finding is that parties on the left of the political spectrum are more likely to introduce pro-labor legislation when in power in order to keep labor supporters despite the external pressures towards deregulation. This literature has made an important headway in understanding labor law but it has not analyzed enforcement. This is a shortcoming given the low levels of compliance with labor regulations in the developing world. Partisanship and interest group theory is based on the effective treatment a group receives rather than in-form benefits. Clearly, employees would benefit little from a new law that increases severance pay if employers do not comply. Therefore, testing the relevance of partisanship politics and interest group theory requires analyzing both laws and enforcement. Do left-leaning governments effectively increase enforcement? Or do they only focus on introducing in-form benefits which are more visible to the electorate? I find that left-oriented governments are more likely to increase enforcement, and this finding is robust to different measures of government enforcement and the inclusion of alternative controls.
Other domestic factors could also affect enforcement. If the primary objective of enforcement agencies is deterrence (Garvie and Keeler, 1994) , then we should expect more enforcement when there is lower compliance with regulations. But, if the goal is social welfare maximization (Polinsky and Shavell, 2000) , and if enforcement produces some informal job destruction, then enforcers could reduce inspections when unemployment is high even if compliance is low. The degree of urbanization could also affect enforcement resources, since it takes more time to enforce regulations in economies with higher spatial decentralization. Several studies show the relevance of the "task environment" to explain enforcement behavior (Kagan 1989; Scholz and Gray 1997) . But these studies focus on developed countries, which tend to have more professional and independent bureaucracies compared to developing countries. Whether these factors affect enforcement in developing countries is still an open question. This paper explores how political and economic factors, both international and domestic, shape government enforcement of labor regulations in 18 Latin American countries:
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. The first challenge is to adequately measure enforcement. In the next section I present a number of new measures and discuss their strengths and limitations. I describe the research design, present results, and discuss the implication of the findings in the final section.
Measuring Inspection Resources and Activities
There is no single source of information to measure labor inspection agencies' resources and activities in Latin America. Therefore, I compiled data and statistics from ministries websites, newspapers, reports produced by the ILO, the US Department of Labor, the US State Department, and a survey of country experts in an effort to build the most comprehensive dataset possible. 1 This dataset is an updated version of the data in Murillo, Ronconi and Schrank (2009) .
The collected information is mainly quantitative, but in some cases qualitative, and includes several measures of enforcement resources and activities. Data about resources usually refers to the number of inspectors who are responsible for enforcing any type of labor regulation in the country, i.e., general labor inspectors. In some cases, however, the available data refers to the number of inspectors enforcing a specific regulation, e.g., child labor, or covering a specific geographic area. There is very little information about the education and wages of inspectors, or about other inspection resources such as computers and vehicles. Data about activities usually refers to the total number of inspections conducted per year, but for some countries the available figures are for the number of fines imposed or the number of workers covered in the inspections. Little information is available about the amount of fines imposed or whether those fines are effectively collected.
To construct measures of enforcement I use the presidential term as the unit of analysis. I exclude dictators and presidents who were in power for twelve months or less. Based on these criteria there are a total of 102 presidential terms in the 18 Latin American countries between 1985 and 2009. I begin with a variant of the ILO's standard enforcement indicator: the ratio of labor inspectors to the economically active population (EAP). Inspectors i is defined as the ratio between the average number of general labor inspectors during presidential term i over the average EAP (in millions) during the same period. Second, I define Inspections i as the ratio between the average number of inspections conducted per year during i over the average EAP (in thousands). In some cases the available data covers all years of the presidential term. When the data covers only a fraction of the term, I assume that the value of the unobserved years equals the average value of the observed years.
The advantages of these two measures are they usefulness to make comparisons both across and within countries over time, and the fact that they provide a quantitative measure of enforcement resources and activities. An important limitation, however, is their low coverage. The data covers 64 of the 102 presidential terms for Inspectors and 41
for Inspections. Furthermore, these two measures exclude a fraction of the quantitative data collected (for instance, data on provincial inspectors or on the number of fines imposed), and all the qualitative information obtained in the survey. Therefore, I construct a third measure -Enforcement Index-which is an ordinal variable that ranks the presidential terms in each country using all the collected information. It is constructed as follows: First, I use the available data on enforcement activity (whether it is inspections, fines imposed or workers covered in the inspections). The presidential term with the lowest level of activity receives a value equal to zero; the presidential term with the second lowest level of activity receives a value equal to one, and so on. Then, I fill the empty cells with data on enforcement resources and the qualitative information. 2 The same procedure is applied to each country. After following this procedure, I obtain a measure of enforcement for 88 out of the 102 presidential terms.
The Enforcement Index is unbalanced over time. It is available for less than half of the presidential terms that took place in the late eighties (7 out of 16), for almost 90 percent of the terms in the nineties (37 out of 42), and for all the terms in the 2000-2009 period (44 out of 44). It is also unbalanced across countries. As shown in table 1, data is available for every presidential term in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. However, it only covers three out of six presidential terms in Colombia and four out of eight in Ecuador. The executive power is likely to have more control over inspection resources relative to inspections activities since it is costly to monitor the behavior of labor inspectors.
<Table 1>
Moreover, Piore and Schrank (2008) argue that the model of inspection in the Latin world gives more discretion to inspectors relative to their counterparts in the United
States. This suggests that the preferences of inspectors are likely to play a role in explaining enforcement activities. But the greater latitude of inspectors in Latin America could be more apparent than real because in many cases they do not have job security, and hence have incentives to follow the instructions of their bosses who are political appointees. Therefore, I expect that the executive power is the main domestic political institution determining both inspection resources and activities.
Whether the government enhances the labor inspectorate depends on a number of external and local factors. Exposure to international markets has increased significantly in Latin America during the analyzed period. Exports increased from 16 percent of GDP in 1985 to 23 percent in 2008, and imports increased from 12 percent to 24 percent during the same period. The penetration of FDI also experienced a significant increase in the region. In South America it grew from 10 percent of GDP in 1985 to 22 percent in 2008 and in Central America from 6 to 32 percent. Producing a tradable good at the lowest possible cost is central to increasing export share and to winning business for local subcontracting firms. Because labor regulations are an important component of production costs, economic globalization can induce governments to engage in a "race to the bottom" in labor standards. Governments can reduce labor standards either by reforming labor codes or by turning a blind eye to noncompliance. The latter can be a politically preferable option because it is less visible to the electorate. Empirical studies in Latin America do not find any significant effect of trade openness of the likelihood of labor law deregulation (Murillo, 2005; Murillo and Schrank, 2005) , but we still know little about the impact of trade on enforcement. To test this hypothesis I use the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP as the measure of Trade Openness. Economic globalization can also affect enforcement via the penetration of FDI. Multinational corporations (MNCs) can press governments to improve the rule of law, but it is likely that they will do it in a selective manner. If their local competitors are noncompliers, MNCs will benefit if the government enforces labor regulations in those firms. But if MNCs' local suppliers are noncompliers, they have an economic incentive to press the government for turning a blind eye in order to keep the cost of their inputs low. I use the stock of FDI to GDP to test whether MNCs shape enforcement (Stock FDI). Trade data is from World Development Indicators and FDI from UNCTAD.
The strategies adopted by the government also depend on the balance of power among domestic interest groups and party organization, and the means citizens have to hold the government accountable. Latin American political scientists have shown that parties on the left of the political spectrum are more likely to introduce pro-labor legislation when in power in order to keep labor supporters and reinforce partisan affinities. This evidence is consistent with the idea that regulation responds to the demands of the government's constituent base. Because workers care about rules-in-use rather than rules-in-form, and given the low levels of compliance in the region, it is necessary to also explore whether partisan links affects enforcement. To capture Executive Ideology of the government, the administrations are coded on an ordinal scale from "left" (-2) to "right" (2), with "centerleft", "center" and "center-right" in between. The data is from Murillo, Oliveros and Vaishnav (2009) , based on an updated version of Coppedge's coding.
Labor unions in Latin America are relatively weak, particularly in the private sector.
They are usually organized by sector of economic activity or by firm, and they do not represent the large informal sector (Murillo, 2001) . Therefore, they are more likely to lobby the inspection agency to focus on their own sectors than pressing for an overall increase in enforcement. Bensusán (2006) 
The Model
The generic version of the model is:
where Y i is a measure of government enforcement of labor regulations during administration i, X is a vector of controls, i.e., democracy, unemployment, GNI per capita, union density and urbanization, D is a set of country dummies or fixed effects, and (1) without including country fixed effects. Column 1 in Table 4 presents the result for Inspectors, column 4 for Inspections and column 7 for the Enforcement Index. There is a negative association between the ideology of the government and enforcement and a positive association between trade and enforcement resources as figures 1 and 2 above suggest.
Results

I begin estimating equation
Columns 2, 5 and 8, present the results including country fixed effects. While this method reduces statistical power, and hence carries the risk that causal hypothesis will be rejected prematurely, it also increases our confidence that results which do emerge as significant are not the consequence of inappropriate econometric methods. The results do confirm that governments on the left are more likely to increase enforcement than governments on the right of the political spectrum.
Trade openness, on the other hand, becomes negatively and statistically significant correlated with both enforcement resources and activities. This suggests that when trade represents a larger share of total production, governments are more likely to turn a blind eye to noncompliance with labor standards.
Penetration of FDI is positively correlated with inspection activities, but only at the 0.10 level of significance. The remaining covariates usually have the expected sign.
Enforcement tends to increase as countries become more democratic, richer, less urbanized and when organized labor is stronger.
<Table 4>
These estimates are obtained using an unbalanced panel. These results are consistent with the idea that governments react to the competitive pressures produced by trade opening by turning a blind eye to noncompliance with labor regulations, but increase enforcement in response to pressures from foreign investors who seek to avoid competition from local non-compliers. The results also suggest that the government reacts to the demands of their constituent base to keep their support and reinforce partisan affinities, and that workers are more effective in more democratic systems.
The data in this paper measures the overall level of enforcement resources and activities by presidential term. Such a level of aggregation does not allow testing a number of hypotheses. First, MNCs are more likely to lobby over the distribution of inspection resources and activities rather than the overall level. Furthermore, because Latin
American countries do not have encompassing labor unions and business associations, these domestic interest groups are also more likely to focus on the distribution of enforcement. Hence, analyzing the distribution of inspections by economic sector of activity or firm would allow a deeper comprehension about the influence of these actors. 10 Second, the dataset contains no information regarding styles of inspection. Piore and Schrank (2008:4) argue that there is a Latin model of inspection, more pedagogical than adversarial compared to the United States; inspectors in Latin American "hope to coach, coax and, only occasionally, coerce firms into compliance with the letter and spirit of the law." According to Bensusán (2007) , until the nineties most countries in the region pursued a punitive strategy to increase compliance, while nowadays most countries put more emphasis on educational and prevention activities. An open question is whether this change in inspection style is a reaction to the pressures of economic globalization. Third, the available data tells little about the efficiency and equity of the enforcement service.
Workers would gain little if inspectors are inoperative, corrupt, or if they only inspect firms that are already in compliance. Although there are accusations against corrupt labor inspector in most countries in the region, Piore and Schrank (2008) find that corruption among Latin American labor inspectors is less common than is generally believed.
Finally, much could be gained by analyzing a longer period. This paper focuses on the last two decades, but government inspection agencies have been created at the beginning of the twenty century in most Latin American countries. 11 Cassoni, Labadie and Fachola (2002) . Finally, I assume that the missing value in year t is equal to the average value between t-1 and t+1. 8 Bensusán (2007) argues that military regimes produced a deterioration of government inspection in Latin America during the eighties, although she does not provide any quantitative evidence. Jatobá (2002) points out that the return to democracy in Chile in 1990 produced a large increase in labor inspection resources.
The sample in this paper excludes dictators, and hence, the analysis is restricted to a comparison between elected governments with different levels of democracy. Argentina in 1912 , Uruguay in 1913 , Chile in 1919 , Peru in 1920 , Brazil in 1921 , Colombia and Panama in 1923 , Bolivia in 1924 , Ecuador and Guatemala in 1926 , Dominican Republic and Mexico in 1930 , Venezuela in 1936 , Nicaragua in 1945 , El Salvador in 1946 , Costa Rica in 1949 and Honduras in 1959 (Romero Gudiño, 2008 Ortega Castillo, 2008; Godinez Vargas, 2008) . Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients in columns 1 to 6 are estimated using OLS, and in columns 7 to 9 using the ordered logit model. Columns 3, 6, and 9 are weighted by the number of observations used to construct the dependent variable. * Significant at the 0.1 level, ** at the 0.05 level, *** at the 0.01 level.
